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Abstract:
Using a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we document that
expectation of having a job in the future is strongly associated with future employment
status. Particularly, individuals who have a higher expectation of having a job one year
later, face a higher probability to have one. Furthermore, we modify a standard search
model of employment to account for this result, thereby providing an explanation for this
observation. These ﬁndings suggest that an analysis of employment and unemployment
should also take expectations of individuals into account.
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11 Introduction
Along with the current great recession, unemployment has again settled on the agenda
of both policy makers and the public. In January of 2010, unemployment rate in the United
States was reported to be 10.6%, the highest unemployment rate since 1983. (Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2010). Likewise, the unemployment rate in the Euro area was 10% in June,
2010 (Eurostat, 2010). There is a large amount of evidence indicating that unemployment
has detrimental eﬀects on individuals’ health (see, McKee Ryan, Song, Wanberg and Kinicki,
2005), therefore in order to improve our understanding of unemployment and employment,
further research is very much needed.
Meta-analytic ﬁndings provided evidence that the negative eﬀects of job loss and unem-
ployment on physical and psychological health can be cured when unemployed become reem-
ployed (Paul and Moser, 2009). Therefore, it is crucial for those who are unemployed to ﬁnd
a job as quickly as possible. To address this issue, both economists and psychologists inves-
tigated predictors of job search and employment, however, these research streams developed
independent from each other. On one side, economists mostly investigated roles of economic
variables in predicting job search, such as reservation wage (Parsons, 1991; Stephenson,
1976), unemployment duration (Oberholzer-Gee, 2008; Vishwanath, 1989), unemployment
insurance (Mortensen, 1977), unemployment rate (Haurin and Sridhar, 2003), and labor
market conditions (Lynch, 1989). On the other side, psychologists examined roles of indi-
vidual diﬀerences such as conscientiousness, optimism, self-esteem, job search self-eﬃcacy,
and job search intensity in the job search process (Kanfer, Wanberg, and Kantrowitz, 2001;
Saks, 2005; Wanberg, Kammeyer-Mueller, and Shi, 2000). Although, scholars repeatedly
made calls for research incorporating psychological and economic models in order to better
understand the job search behavior (e.g., Feather, 1992; McFadyen and Thomas,1997), not
much has been done up to date. In one of few studies addressing this call, Wanberg, Hough
and Song (2002) developed a multidisciplinary model of reemployment including predictors
from the ﬁelds of economics, sociology and psychology. More recently, McGee (2010) and
Mohanty (2010) investigated the roles of psychological variables in job search, nevertheless,
2there is still a signiﬁcant room for improvement of current research.
To address this gap, by incorporating a psychological variable, expectations, into an
economic model of employment both theoretically and empirically, we contribute to the lit-
erature in two distinct ways: First, using a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (NLSY), we document that expectation of having a job in the future is strongly
associated with future employment status. Particularly, individuals who have a higher ex-
pectation of having a job one year later, face a higher probability to have one. Second, we
modify a standard search model of employment to account for this result, thereby providing
an explanation for this observation.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In the next two subsections we review
the literature on the expectancy-value theory of job search and list the diﬀerences of our
study, respectively. Then, we empirically document that expectations have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on employment status. In section 3, we present an economic model to understand
how expectations aﬀect employment status theoretically. In section 4, we run simulations
using our model to show how the model accounts for our empirical observation. Finally, we
conclude.
1.1 Expectancy-value theory of job search
Feather (1992) applied expectancy-value theory, a cognitive-motivational theory explain-
ing human behavior, to job search behavior. Brieﬂy, according to the expectancy-value
theory, behavior is determined both by an individual’s expectation regarding the outcome of
the behavior and by the value that the individual attributes to this outcome (Feather, 1982).
While expectation refers to an individual’s belief that performing the behavior will lead to
the desired outcome, value refers to the perceived attractiveness of the outcome. On one
side, expectations are formed by an individual’s perception on her ability to achieve desired
outcome, as well as her past performance. On the other side, value is formed by the needs or
philosophy of life of the individual. Note that, in the psychology literature, expectancy-value
theory has been used to account for various behaviors such as social loaﬁng (Shepperd and
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Ahtola, 1972), achievement performance (Wigﬁeld, 1994) and health behavior (Van der Pligt
and De Vries, 1998).
Applying expectancy-value theory to job search behavior, one can argue that, the more
an individual expects to ﬁnd a job and the more she values having one, the more she searches
for it. Moreover, Feather (1992) links expectancy and value to future employment status,
hypothesizing that people who intensely look for a job, will very likely ﬁnd one. Consistent
with this hypothesis, in a sample of unemployed individuals, Lynd-Stevenson (1999) found
that job expectancy and job importance predicted future employment status.
Several other researchers used expectancy-value theory to investigate whether expecta-
tions and value predicted job search behavior. Findings with respect to the value were
consistent, all pointing that individuals who place a higher value on having a job display
more intense job search behavior than those who place lower value (e.g., Feather and O’Brien,
1987; Vansteenkiste, Lens, De Witte, and Feather, 2005). However, ﬁndings regarding the
eﬀects of expectations were mixed. Some of the previous studies reported a signiﬁcant pos-
itive relationship between job expectation and intensity of job search (e.g., Feather and
Davenport, 1981), some found a negative relationship (e.g., Vansteenkiste, et al., 2005), and
some others found no relationship at all (e.g., Feather and O’Brien, 1987). Moreover, re-
cently, meta-analytic ﬁndings demonstrated diverse relationships between optimism, a form
of expectancy, and job search outcomes (Kanfer, et al., 2001). Accordingly, optimism pre-
dicted employment status, but not the job search behavior. These inconsistent ﬁndings led
researchers to review their hypotheses about the relationship between job expectancy and
job search. In their previous papers, Feather and his colleagues (Feather and Davenport,
1981; Feather and O’Brien, 1987) proposed that frequency of job search behavior is posi-
tively correlated with the job seeker’s expectation of ﬁnding a job. However, inconsistent
ﬁndings regarding the relationship between expectations and job search led researchers to
discuss alternative relationships. For example, it is proposed that higher expectations might
aﬀect job search behavior negatively (Feather, 1992). Speciﬁcally, individuals with higher
4expectations of ﬁnding a job might reduce their job search intensity. In other words, they
might overestimate their capability, at the same time underestimate external reality. It may
also be the case that job seekers who target high status jobs might fail ﬁnding one, even if
they search intensely. All these alternative explanations indicate that the direction of the
relationship between job expectancy and job search is an open question.
1.2 The Present Study
There is an increasing interest in investigating the eﬀects of psychological variables on
labor market outcomes. However, this interest is mostly focused on earnings. Researchers
examined how individual diﬀerences such as self-esteem and personality aﬀect earnings (Ny-
hus and Pons, 2005; Goldsmith, Veum, Darity, 1997; Mohanty, 2009). However, research on
incorporating psychological variables into economic models of job search is scarce. In one
of the few studies, Mohanty (2010) examined the roles of positive attitudes and optimism
on employment. He found that these psychological variables have a signiﬁcant impact on
employment status, above and beyond the eﬀects of other economic variables. In another
econometric study, McGee (2010) investigated the role of locus of control on job search
intensity and found that internal job seekers (who believe that outcomes are under their
control) searched more intensely than external ones (who believe that outcomes are out of
their control). Although, Mohanty (2010) and McGee (2010) focused on expectation-related
variables such as optimism and locus of control, they used them as proxies for general ex-
pectations. Our study extends the current literature, since we directly consider employment
expectations.
Additionally, in the economic behavior literature, researchers examined the eﬀects of ex-
pectations on economic behaviors, investment behavior (Anderson and Goldsmith, 1997),
commodity purchases (Swenson ,1997) and saving behavior (Van Raaij, 1989). However, to
the best of our knowledge, there is no study which investigated the eﬀect of employment
expectation on employment status. In this regard, our paper contributes to the literature
in several ways: First, using data from a representative sample in the United States, we
5empirically document that expectancy is one of the crucial factors determining future em-
ployment status. As might be expected, the ﬁndings of this study will help us to improve our
understanding of the relationship between expectancy and employment. Second, we show
that this observation is consistent with a modiﬁed version of a search model of employment.
This modiﬁcation allows us to examine the theoretical causes of the relationship established
in the empirical analysis. Third, we compare our model’s performance against the data and
outline some policy recommendations.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The
NLSY97 is directed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and aims
to investigate young individuals’ transition from school to work. The NLSY97 consists of a
nationally representative sample and continues on annual basis. In the ﬁrst round, conducted
in 1997, 8,984 individuals whose ages ranged from 12 to 18 were interviewed. The NLSY97
provides information on labor market and educational experiences of its participants. More-
over, it collects information on other topics such as relationships with parents, expectations
and criminal behavior.
2.2 Sample
Since our sample consists of individuals who provided responses to all of our study vari-
ables, the number of participants reduces to 5,472. The mean age of our sample is 17.9
years (SD=1.43). Fifty percent of the participants are female, and 62.7% of them are White.
Moreover, 54.8% of our sample is employed. Twenty-eight percent of the participants com-
pleted 12thgrade. Ninety-two percent of the participants are not married, neither are they
living with a partner. The mean of the cumulative worked hours from age 14 through age 19
is 1,730 hours (SD=1948). Seventy-four percent of our sample lives in an urban area. Finally,
6in terms of parental education, 47% of the participants’ mother and 47.3% of participant’s
father have a high school diploma.
2.3 Measures
Independent variable: In the NLSY97, employment expectations were measured in
years 1997 and 2000. Because the participants were quite young in 1997, we report results
using the data from 2000. In the survey, employment expectations were measured with the
following item: ”If you are not in school a year from now, what is the percent chance that
you will be working for pay more than 20 hours per week?” Responses to this question were
given in a range from 0 to 100.
Dependent variable: Employment status one year later is obtained from 2001 data
(0=not employed, 1=employed).
Control variables: With the data from the year 2000, we controlled several variables
which might aﬀect future employment status. Along with age, gender (1=male, 2=female)
and race (1=White, 2=Black, 3=Indian, 4=Asian, 5=other), we also controlled for edu-
cation. Education was measured with the following question: ”What is the highest grade
you have ever completed as of today?”. Furthermore, we obtained work experience of the
respondents from the data on cumulative hours worked at an employee-type job from age 14
through age 19. Moreover, participants were asked whether they are living with a partner (or
are married) (0=not married, 1=married/living with partner) and whether they live in an
urban or rural area (0=rural, 1=urban). Finally, we also controlled for parental education,
by simply adding years of education received by the respondent’s father and mother1 and
for the unemployment rate of the area in which the respondent lived in 2001.2
1In the results we report, to avoid collinearity, we did not include father’s and mother’s education
separately as these two variables are highly correlated with each other with a correlation of 0.60. However,
results of regressions we obtained by adding mother’s and father’s education separately do not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer from those which are reported. Moreover, we should state that none of the other two variables have a
correlation higher than 0.25.
2NLSY divides the country in four main areas: South, West, Midwest and Northeast. Unemployment
rates of these areas are obtained from BLS.
72.4 Estimation Results
We intend to estimate a relationship linking probability of being employed in the future
to expectations and various other control variables. One such possibility could be estimating
the following equation:
Empi = β0 + β1expi +
n X
k=2
βkXki + i, (1)
where Empi is a binary variable indicating whether the individual is employed or not.
Moreover, expi stands for the respondent’s expectation (formed in year 2000) of the prob-
ability of ﬁnding a job next year and Xki,t are the other explanatory variables used in the
regression. As it is well known, due to the binary nature of the dependent variable, esti-
mating this linear relationship in equation 1 creates certain problems. Therefore, a more
appropriate procedure is using a logit or probit analysis.






1, if i is employed in 2001
0 if is unemployed in 2001.




Pr(empi = 1|xi) = F(x
0
iβ)
Pr(empi = 0|xi) = 1 − Pr(yi = 1|xi) = 1 − F(x
0
iβ).
Table 1 reports the coeﬃcient estimates obtained using the logit approach with F being






















where f(.) is the density function corresponding to the cumulation distribution F(.).
Since our sample size is quite large, as expected probit and logit regression results are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. Therefore, we report only the results of the latter
here. 3
Table 1 about here
In Table 1 we report results of three diﬀerent estimations. First, we include all the control
variables along with expectations and report the results in column 2. As hypothesized, the
coeﬃcient of expectations is positive and highly signiﬁcant, even at 1% level of signiﬁcance.
Next, in column 3 of Table 1, we report the marginal eﬀect of each variable evaluated at the
mean of this variable in the whole sample.
Once the marginal eﬀects are calculated, Figure 1 draws the probability of being employed
in 2001 against expectations, using the estimated coeﬃcients and xi’s evaluated at their mean
levels. The shape of the ﬁgure and the eﬀect of expectations on future employment status
are striking. An individual who certainly (with a 100 % expectation) expects to ﬁnd a job
one year later has almost 15% higher chance of being actually employed compared to an
individual who certainly expects not to ﬁnd a job (with a 0 % expectation).
Figure 1 about here
Next, we also estimate a regression without including expectations among the explanatory
variables. This is reported in column 4. Moreover, to check the robustness of our results,
3Probit regression results are available upon request from the authors.
9we also run a regression without including the non-signiﬁcant independent variables. This
is reported in column 5.
We also stratify our sample into various sub-samples. Speciﬁcally, we run regressions
separately for females, males, whites, blacks, singles, those who live with partners (or are
married) and ﬁnally for those who were employed in 2000 and were unemployed in 2000.
Table 2 about here
Regression results for these sub-samples are reported in Table 2 and Table 3. For all of
the sub-samples, higher expectations are associated with a higher chance of being employed
in the subsequent year. As one can observe from the columns reporting the marginal eﬀects,
estimates range from 5% for those who were employed in 2000 to 30 % for blacks.
Table 3 about here
The short summary we conclude from this section is that expectations formed for being
employed over a year signiﬁcantly aﬀect employment status one year later. Speciﬁcally,
individuals who have a higher expectation of being employed over the next year end up
with a higher probability of having a job. This result is robust to diﬀerent econometric
speciﬁcations, stratiﬁcations of the sample and inclusion of various control variables.
3 Economic Model
As we have documented in the previous section, our sample indicated that expectations
for having a job in the future strongly increase the actual probability of having one. In this
section, our purpose is to examine whether such a relationship can be supported by a modiﬁed
job search model of employment. Such an analysis possesses the potential of identifying
theoretical causes of this relationship between expectations and employment status.4
To illustrate and test how expectations might aﬀect employment in a job search model,
we borrow from the basic model a la McCall (1970). We assume that the representative
4In order to simplify the readability of this section, we decided to relegate most of the technical language
and details to the appendix.







where U(.) is the instantaneous utility function, t is the time subscript and β is the
subjective discount factor of the worker. 5
Given this speciﬁcation, now we can consider the problem faced by an agent having an
oﬀer w in period t:
If this agent accepts the oﬀer with w, her life time utility can be represented with the
following value function:
U(w) + β{ˆ γv(w) + (1 − ˆ γ)[U(0) + β






In this speciﬁcation, once the oﬀer is accepted, the worker enjoys an instantaneous utility
U(w). Next, in the following period, once the utility is discounted by the discount factor
β she faces two possibilities: Keeping the job or losing it. We assume that she expects to
keep the job with subjective probability ˆ γ. Similarly, 1 − ˆ γ is the subjective probability of
expecting of being ﬁred (or losing the job) in the next period. In this case, the agent does
not get any wage for one period and therefore receives U(0), and then expects to receive an
oﬀer w0 from the wage oﬀer distribution with probability density f(w0) and range between
0 and E ¯ w. Notice that wage oﬀers are arising from a compact support of [0,E ¯ w]. The key
assumption here is that ¯ w might take two values: ¯ wh or ¯ wl with subjective probabilities of
α and 1 − α, respectively. We denote the expected value of highest possible job oﬀer by
E ¯ w = α ¯ wh + (1 − α)¯ wl. We should also notice here that ˆ γ is not necessarily equal to the
actual probability of continuing the job next period. We denote the latter by γ and allow
for γ and ˆ γ to be diﬀerent from each other.
On the other hand, if the worker does not accept working at the oﬀered wage of w, she
5Moreover, we assume that U is strictly increasing and strictly concave in w. In technical terms we
assume that dU
dw > 0 and d
2U
dw2 < 0.
11has the following life-time utility:
U(0) + β






The interpretation of the above equation is quite similar to the previous one. Since the
worker does not work in this period, she does not enjoy any utility from a wage, that is
why we have the U(0) term. Moreover, next period she expects to receive another job oﬀer
within [0,E ¯ w] with an oﬀer density of f(w0).
Therefore, the problem faced by an agent in the current period is the following:
v(w) = max

U(w) + β{ˆ γv(w) + (1 − ˆ γ)(v(0)},U(0) + β







Under suitable assumptions6 we can prove that the optimal decision making of the worker
is of the reservation wage form, i.e. the worker accepts a wage oﬀer w, if and only if it is
larger than a certain level of reservation wage, denoted by w∗ and rejects it otherwise.7
Moreover, we can also prove the following results on the behavior of the reservation wage:
Proposition 1 The reservation wage decreases as the subjective probability of losing the job
next period, ˆ γ, or the expected value of highest possible job oﬀer next period, E ¯ w, decreases.
The ﬁrst result in the above proposition asserts that the reservation wage of the worker is
a decreasing function of her expectation of being ﬁred from the job next period, conditional
on accepting the job this period. In this sense, a worker who accepts a job oﬀer today has
a lower reservation wage, if she expects that chances to be ﬁred from the job are higher.
Moreover, the second result shows that the worker reduces her reservation wage if she
expects to receive a lower job oﬀer next period.
Notice that our ultimate purpose is to link the probability of being employed or unem-
ployed to expectations for the future. One interpretation of the ﬁrst result in Proposition 1
6See the appendix for a rigorous discussion of the theoretical results presented in this section.
7All the proofs in this section are relegated to the appendix.
12is that the less a worker expects to continue working in the job she intends to accept, the
lower is her reservation wage. Similarly for the second result, if a worker expects to receive
lower job oﬀers in the future, the lower is her reservation wage. These two propositions in a
way show that expectations for the future have repercussions on today’s decisions.
Now, we need to link the results on the reservation wage of the worker to the probability
of being employed or unemployed. To do this, we proceed as follows:
Since the worker only accepts oﬀers when they are above the reservation wage w∗, we
denote the probability that a job oﬀer w is accepted by the agent by φ = Prob(w ≥ w∗).
Given the probability φ and denoting the probability of being unemployed in the current
period t, ut, we can deﬁne the probability of being unemployed in the next period t+1, ut+1
as follows:
ut+1 = ut(1 − φ) + (1 − ut)(1 − γ)(1 − φ).
As the above equation shows, probability of being unemployed tomorrow consists of two
components: First term, ut(1−φ) , refers to the case of being unemployed today in t and not
accepting the job oﬀer. The second term, (1 − ut)(1 − γ)(1 − φ), refers to the case of being
employed today in t, however the worker might be ﬁred tomorrow with an actual probability
of (1 − γ) and then not accept a job with a probability of (1 − φ).
We can easily show that this diﬀerence equation converges to a steady state probability
of being unemployed, ut = ut+1 = u∗ which is equal to:
u
∗ =
(1 − γ)(1 − φ)
φ + (1 − φ)(1 − γ)
.
Given this deﬁnition u∗ we can prove the following result:
Proposition 2 Probability of being employed in the steady state equilibrium, (1-u∗), is in-
creasing in φ.
This quite intuitive result above will provide us the link between expectations for the
future and probability of being employed. Any parameter of the model related to future
13expectations which would increase φ, would immediately reduce u∗.
4 Model Simulations
In this section, we will simulate the model presented in the previous section. The main
purpose of this section is to get numerical results from the economic model which are con-
sistent with the empirical observations we documented in the second section of the paper.
Remembering the form of the question on expectations from the NLSY survey, we can
use two parameters of the model as proxies for expectations. One of them is the ˆ γ and
the other one is α. As we have proved in the previous section, reducing ˆ γ, decreases the
reservation wage and therefore increases φ and 1 − u∗, the probability of being employed in
the steady state equilibrium.
Another possible parameter we can use is α. As we proved in the previous section,
reducing α decreases the reservation wage.8 The intuition was that if a worker expects to
receive lower job oﬀers in the future, she reduces her reservation wage. This immediately
increases φ and 1 − u∗.
What we are after in this section is to ﬁnd a numerical relationship between the proba-
bility of being employed in the steady state equilibrium 1 − u∗ and expected probability of
accepting a job oﬀer φ and then compare this relationship against their data counterparts,
namely estimated probability of ﬁnding a job and expectations.
4.1 Simulation Procedure
To perform the simulation exercise we need to make certain assumptions on the values
of some parameters and on functional forms. To do this, we follow Fitzgerald (1998) and
assume that f(.) follows uniform density with f(w) = 1
¯ w. Moreover, similar to Fitzgerald
(1998) for the discount rate β we use a value of 0.95 consistent with a 5% annual yearly
interest rate. We also set values of the two highest possible job oﬀers to ¯ wl = 1 and ¯ wh = 2.
8See the proof of Proposition 1 for this.
14Finally, as the utility function we use U(w) = log(1 + w).
We calibrate the value of ˆ γ to match the average level of expectations in our data set.
This value turns out to be 0.17. And ﬁnally the actual ﬁring rate γ is also calibrated, this
time to match the average level of probability of ﬁnding a job estimated from the data. The
calibrated value of γ is 0.26. This value is not a lot diﬀerent from the one used by Fitzgerald
(1998) where the author uses a ﬁring rate of 0.5% per-week which corresponds to γ = 29.6%
in a yearly time horizon.
Given these assumptions and calibrations together with any value of α, we use the equa-
tion B.1 in the proof of Proposition 1 to calculate the value of w∗, and then given w∗ we
obtain the value of φ.
4.2 Model vs. Data
The parameter we allow to vary is α. Speciﬁcally, we reduce α from 1 to 0 and for each
value of α our model generates a value for 1 − u∗ and for φ.
Following this, Figure 2 draws the model generated 1 − u∗ vs. model generated φ and
compares it against their data counterparts from Figure 1. As the Figure 2 clearly illustrates,
the model is well capable of generating a positive relationship between expectations for future
job oﬀers and probability of being employed.
Figure 2 about here
4.3 Interpreting Simulation Outcome
The simulation exercise we performed in this section helps us to identify one factor, a
change in the expected future wage oﬀer, as a possible cause for the established relationship
between expectations and probability of employment. Due to the types of questions asked
in the NLSY97 survey, we were not able to deduct this factor from the empirical analysis.
However, the theory and the simulations conducted using the simple search model we can
name at least one factor, namely α. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it is the only
factor which might cause the positive relationship between expectations and probability of
15employment. As we have mentioned above, another possibility was changing ˆ γ, subjective
probability of losing (or being ﬁred from) the job once accepting the oﬀer. A similar simu-
lation exercise might be performed by varying ˆ γ. In a richer model with more ingredients,
some other variables could also be identiﬁed as factors behind the expectations-employment
relationship.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the role of expectations in determining
future employment status. Using data from the NLSY97, we showed that individuals who
place a higher probability on being employed in the following year are more likely to be
employed. In sum, our results demonstrated the importance of expectations in predicting
future employment status.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways: First, although past researchers
examined the roles of optimism and locus of control in job search behavior, respectively, they
used them as proxies for general expectations. While Mohanty (2010) measured optimism as
”being hopeful about the future”, McGee (2010) used Rotter’s scale which measures general
locus of control. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst one which directly
investigated the eﬀect of employment expectations on future employment status.
Second, since our sample is large and representative, the ﬁndings might help to improve
our understanding of the relationship between expectations and employment. Our results
demonstrated that expectations increase the probability of employment. Previously, it was
proposed that expectations might lower employment probability by leading the job seeker to
overvalue her qualiﬁcations and to reduce her job search intensity (Feather, 1992). However,
our ﬁndings indicated that this proposition is not the case.
Third, we showed that the eﬀect of expectations on future employment status can be
accounted for by a modiﬁed search model of employment. This might be interpreted as
a response to calls for incorporating psychological and economic approaches to job search.
Although there is a growing body of research which investigates the eﬀects of psychological
16variables on economic behaviors, research on job search in this sense is scarce. In our model
simulations, we demonstrated how expectations-employment relationship is established. An
individual who expects a lower job oﬀer in the future reduces her reservation wage. This, in
turn, increases the probability of accepting a job oﬀer next period and reduces the probability
of being unemployed. Surely, we do not argue that this is the only mechanism linking
expectations to future employment status. Our explanation is one among possible other
mechanisms. Moreover, this area deserves further research eﬀorts. For example, future
research might incorporate other psychological variables such as positive aﬀectivity and
psychological well-being into an economic model of employment. Additionally, in this study
we used expectation dimension of expectancy-value theory. However, other theories might
also help to improve our understanding of the job search mechanism. For example, Bryant
(1990) applied prospect theory to a study of job search.
In terms of practical implications, our ﬁndings provide some information for job seekers
and career counselors. Career counselors should increase the awareness of job seekers regard-
ing the role of expectations in the job search process. Labor market policies and interventions
should encourage job seekers to keep their expectations high.
To conclude, Feather (1992, p. 315) noted that ”comprehensive approach to questions
about unemployment will involve contributions from diﬀerent disciplines”. Since unemploy-
ment is one of the major economic problems of today’s world, scholars coming from diﬀerent
disciplines such as economics, sociology and psychology should incorporate diﬀerent models
and approaches in order to ﬁnd solutions to this global issue.
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21Appendix
A Reservation Wage
In this subsection we show that the optimal decision making of the worker is of the
reservation wage form.9 Now once we deﬁne U(0) + β
R E ¯ w
0 v(w)f(w)dw = C, since it is






C, w ∈ [0,w∗]
u(w)+β(1−ˆ γ)C
1−βˆ γ w ∈ [w∗, ¯ w]
Proof. The proof of the above corollary follows from v(0) = C, v(¯ w) > C and the facts that
U(w) is strictly and v(w) is weakly increasing in w. Along with the continuity of U and v
there must exist a w∗ ∈ [0, ¯ w] which satisﬁes the stated equation in the corollary.
B Proofs of Proposition 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof. To see the comparative static result stated in proposition 1, we use the result in
corollary 1 to rewrite C as follows:
C = βCF(w
∗) +
β2(1 − ˆ γ)C(1 − F(w∗)
1 − β(ˆ γ)
+ β
Z E ¯ w
w∗
U(w)




Combining this with C = u(w∗+β(ˆ γv(w∗)+(1−ˆ γ)C) we obtain the crucial equation which





− ˆ γ) = β







9We will quickly skim over the proofs here. For more details one can look at any textbook of dynamic
macroeconomics which includes search theory.
22Since U is assumed to be a strictly increasing function in w, from here it is straightforward
to see that w∗ is increasing in ˆ γ and E ¯ w. Since E ¯ w is increasing in α, so is w∗, too.
Proof of Proposition 2:




(ˆ γ − 1)φ
(φ + (1 − φ)(1 − ˆ γ))2
.
The fact that ˆ γ − 1 is negative immediately yields the desired result.
23C Tables and Figures
Table 1: Employment Status and Expectations: Whole Sample
Dep. Var.: Future Emp. Stat.
Coeﬀ. ME Coeﬀ. Coeﬀ.
Currently Employed 1.32*** 0.31 1.36*** 1.34***
(19.75) (20.25) (20.23)
Age -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
(-0.70) (-0.82)
Experience 0.0002*** 0.00005 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(8.65) (8.87) (10.82)
Parental Ed. 0.004 0.001 0.005
(0.27) (0.29)
Gender 0.12* 0.03 0.11* 0.14**
(1.74) (1.69) (2.26)
Education 0.10 0.02 0.11
(0.92) (1.08)
Marital Status 0.06 0.01 0.04
(0.39) (0.24)
Race -0.03 -0.007 -0.03
(-1.27) (-1.27)
Regional Unemployment -0.05 -0.01 -0.05
(-0.51) (-0.48)
Urban-Rural -0.007 -0.001 -0.01
(-0.09) (-0.14)
Expectations 0.006*** 0.001 0.007***
(4.32) (4.43)
McFadden R-squared 0.15 0.14 0.14
Observations 5472 5472 5472
LR Statistic 1070.02 1048.92 1055.70
log likelihood -3124.35 -3134.89 -3131.50
Robust z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 1, 5 and 10% conﬁdence levels, respectively. In all

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Figure 1: Expectations and Probability of Employment
28Figure 2: Expectations and Probability of Employment: Data vs. Model
29